Dishonest behavior significantly increases the cost of medical care provision.
INTRODUCTION
Dishonest behavior significantly affects the cost of medical care provision in many health care systems around the world. One common form of dishonest (or fraudulent) behavior in health care is the so-called upcoding of patients to attract higher reimbursements (e.g., Carter, Newhouse, & Relles, 1990; Dafny, 2005) . Upcoding typically implies that patients are coded such that their case is related to a more complex illness or treatment, which results in reimbursement for services that are either never provided or not medically necessary. These fraudulent behaviors have lead to substantial financial losses for insurers and patients. 1 To curtail upcoding, imposing audit mechanisms that include fines for fraudulent behavior is a widely discussed means among health care policy-makers. In general, the classical theoretical motivation for simultaneously implementing audits and fines is the following: Dishonest behavior declines whenever the audit probability-assumed to increase the probability of detection-and the size of the fine are such that the expected utility from honesty exceeds the expected utility from dishonesty (e.g., Becker, 1968; Mookherjee & Png, 1989) . These considerations emphasize the importance of introducing audits with real monetary consequences for detected fraudulent behaviors. In the United States, for example, the National Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program coordinates federal, state, and local law enforcement activities with respect to health care fraud and abuse by performing fraud reviews and cost report audits. The Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has the authority to impose fines (i.e., civil monetary penalties) against health care providers who knowingly submit false claims to the federal government (Cantrell, 2015) . 2 Empirically, however, it is not well understood how (random) audits including fines affect the behavior of health care providers. Part of the reason is that the use of field data has proven to be quite difficult because of the typical hidden nature of fraudulent behaviors and issues of endogeneity related to introducing audits and fines. Evidence from controlled experiments is also quite limited. In a field experiment, Lindeboom, van der Klaauw, and Vriend (2016) study the effect of changes in audit rates without a fine on Dutch health care providers' behavior and report almost no evidence for behavioral responses. Although this finding suggests the importance of coupling audits with fines (consequences) for fraudulent behaviors, empirical evidence on how audits and fines simultaneously affect behavior is still lacking.
Further, empirical studies on diagnosis-related group (DRG) upcoding typically are based on aggregated data. In neonatology, for example, Jürges and Köberlein (2015) report substantial DRG upcoding at the aggregate level using German birth statistics data. Shigeoka and Fushimi (2014) analyzed insurance claim data for in-hospital births in Japan. Using these data, it seems difficult to assess how audit mechanisms and fines affect individual decision makers. Moreover, individuals are heterogenous in their behavioral responses to audits and fines, and individuals' characteristics such as gender, personalty traits, and integrity might relate to dishonest behavior. Several (neutrally framed) experiments report that women are more honest than men (e.g., Dreber & Johannesson, 2008; Houser, Vetter, & Winter, 2012) . Integrity has been found to be inversely related to a wide variety of reported antisocial behavior (e.g., Schlenker, 2008) . Personality traits are suggested to influence individuals' behavior although the context of the decision situation matters (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, & Ter Weel, 2008) . In health care contexts, some evidence exists that behavior relates to personality (e.g., Callen, Gulzar, Hasanain, Khan, & Rezaee, 2018; Donato, Miller, Mohanan, Truskinovsky, & Vera-Hernández, 2017 ), yet the evidence on the relation between dishonesty and personality is rather mixed (Heck, Thielmann, Moshagen, & Hilbig, 2018) . In health care, it is largely unexplored whether and, if so, how individuals' characteristics relate to behavior in fraud-supporting environments (due to, e.g., the incentive structure and the absence of audits and fines) and to responses regarding audits and fines.
In this paper, we contribute to filling these gaps by introducing a controlled behavioral experiment framed in a medical context. The experimental decision situation is motivated by the usual individual reporting task in neonatal care units-in particular, entering the birth weight of preterm infants into their birth records. Medical and nonmedical students (N = 98) decide in the role of obstetrics staff members. The nonlinear incentive scheme mimics the German DRG structure for neonatal care, which primarily depends on the birth weight from the first weighing recorded in the birth report. We consider two thresholds (1,250 and 1,500 g) at which the DRG payment almost doubles when reporting a birth weight below the respective thresholds. Subjects receive a lump-sum payment and a variable component depending on their birth weight reports. Costs for medical treatment depend on the true birth weight and are deducted from the DRG payment. Therefore, subjects can increase profits significantly when they upcode by fraudulently reporting a birth weight lower than the DRG thresholds (due to the nonlinear, discrete DRG scheme); we call such behavior dishonest.
In the experiment, we introduce a baseline No-Audit treatment in which upcoding cannot be detected. We assume that random audits do not take place and, thus, create a stylized situation that embeds a strong incentive for fraud as no fines are to be expected-yet we use it as our benchmark to incentivize maximal upcoding. In addition, we introduce, in a between-subject design, a treatment with random audits and fines. Experimental parameters are such that only discrepancies of more than 50 g between the reported birth weight and the actual birth weight can be detected by an audit. Smaller deviations cannot be discovered. Audits take place with a 10% probability. 3 Detected dishonesty implies a fine, amounting to discarding all the aggregate earnings for the reporting task. In the baseline treatment without audit, dishonesty has no financial consequences for subjects. Further, since we can identify cheating individually, our experimental design allows us to study the link between dishonesty and personality traits such as the Big Five (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; Rammstedt & John, 2007) or integrity (Schlenker, 2008) .
Our study is the first behavioral economic experiment to analyze dishonest behavior in health care. It is meant to complement empirical studies. It is worth highlighting the main reasons why we chose an experimental approach: (a) Dishonest behavior is usually hidden and difficult to elicit at an individual level when using field data (e.g., Charness & Kuhn, 2011; Galizzi & Wiesen, 2018) . (b) Our controlled lab environment enables us to analyze the causal effect of one variable of interest in an otherwise stable scenario (e.g., Falk & Heckman, 2009 )-in particular, the effect of audits and fines on dishonesty. (c) The availability of individual behavioral data allows the link to individual characteristics (e.g., Cubel, Nuevo-Chiquero, Sanchez-Pages, & Vidal-Fernandez, 2016; Donato, Miller, Mohanan, Truskinovsky, & Vera-Hernandez, 2017) .
We are aware that upcoding in neonatology can be a matter of complex institutional features and organizational culture. For example, one might argue that upcoding is a product of decisions that often take place outside of the domain of any individual health care provider. While we abstract from this complexity, we maintain, however, the general features and incentive structure of the upcoding decision in neonatal practice in our experiment. In German neonatal care units, upcoding of birth weights is at the discretion of individual doctors, midwives, or nurses involved in the delivery of preterm infants in neonatal care units. In sum, we are aware that the experimental approach leaves out most of the real-world complexity and should be regarded as a "proof of principle" (Hagel, Milinski, & Marotzke, 2017) . This is the strength but at the same time the limitation of any experimental study (e.g., Falk & Fehr, 2003; Falk & Heckman, 2009 ).
In our experimental neonatal care setting, we address the following research questions: (1) Do subjects in the baseline treatment engage in DRG upcoding (i.e., dishonest behavior), and if so, to what extent? (2) Does introducing audits and fines reduce the upcoding of birth weights? If so, to what extent is upcoding reduced? (3) Does introducing audits and fines lead to less upcoding in general or only to less upcoding at birth weights where dishonesty becomes detectable through audits? (4) How do the individual characteristics such as (a) major in medicine or economics and (b) gender relate to upcoding, and how do these characteristics relate to behavioral responses when audits and fines are introduced? (5) How do individuals' (a) personality traits, (b) risk aversion, and (c) integrity relate to dishonesty and to behavioral responses to audits and fines?
Our behavioral data evidence substantial upcoding. We find that nearly 75% of all decisions in the No-Audit treatment are dishonest, in that they increase subjects' payoffs by upcoding. When excluding birth weights where there is no financial gain from dishonesty, the proportion of dishonest reports is 87%. When participants are given the choice of partial or full dishonesty (i.e., at the birth weight of 1,500 g when upcoding by one or two DRG thresholds is feasible), 70% of the participants are fully dishonest and 25% are partially dishonest. Only 5% are honest. Introducing audits and fines significantly reduces upcoding by 27 percentage points. This reduction is concentrated on birth weights where detection is possible. At birth weights where participants can choose to be partially dishonest, honest entries increase by 15%. In addition, we find a shift from (detectable) fully dishonest to (nondetectable) partially dishonest behavior: The latter doubles, whereas the former is cut by half. Participants seem to prefer to choose the safe but lower profit rather than the risky but maximal return.
Individual characteristics are related to upcoding and responses to Audit-and-fine. We find that medical students are more dishonest under No-Audit than economics students, but introducing Audit-and-fine affects medical students more strongly than economics students. Men and women are similarly dishonest under No-Audit, but women react more strongly to Audit-and-fine than men. Personality traits do not relate to upcoding behavior in a robust and systematic way across treatments. Further, we find that risk-averse individuals tend to report birth weights less fraudulently, although not significantly so. The integrity of individuals is also related to upcoding: Individuals with higher integrity report birth weights more honestly than individuals with lower integrity.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we relate our contributions to the literature. Section 3 reports the institutional background of neonatal care units in Germany, and Section 4 describes the experimental design and procedure. In Section 5, we present the results from our experiment. Section 6 discusses our results, and Section 7 concludes.
Krankenhausgesellschaft), and according to §17 c Section 2 Krankenhausfinanzierungsgesetz. In surveys, German hospitals reported that 8% (in 2008) and 15% (in 2016) of all inpatient cases have undergone an audit by the MDK; see Blum, Offermans, and Perner (2009) and Blum, Offermanns, Perner, and Steffen (2017, p. 80 ).
CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
Our study contributes to several streams of the literature. First, we complement empirical research on DRG upcoding in health care markets. Early studies have already pointed to the unintended consequences of introducing DRG-based payment systems, 4 namely, the attempt by hospitals to increase revenues through fraudulent coding practices (e.g., Barros & Braun, 2017; Carter et al., 1990; Dafny, 2005; Januleviciute, Askildsen, Kaarboe, Siciliani, & Sutton, 2016; Silverman & Skinner, 2004) . Shigeoka and Fushimi (2014) , Jürges and Köberlein (2015) , and Reif, Wichert, and Wuppermann (2018) report evidence for DRG upcoding in neonatal care in Japan and Germany. Common to all these studies is that evidence is provided at an aggregate level. Our behavioral experiment is a complementary investigation to the latter field studies as we analyze upcoding at an individual subject level in a neonatal care context.
Second, we relate to the literature on audits. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of audits is rather scarce and primarily comes from neutrally framed laboratory experiments. For example, Clark, Friesen, and Muller (2004) analyze random auditing, a conditional audit rule, and an optimal audit rule. They find the latter two to be associated with fewer audits, whereas the compliance rate is maximized under random auditing. Cason and Gangadharan (2006) propose an experiment addressing Harrington's (1988) paradox (compliance to regulations even though the frequency of inspections and audits is low), in which they vary the probability of inspection and the severity of a fine. They report that compliance behavior does not change as sharply as the model predicts. In a field experiment, Lindeboom et al. (2016) study the effect of changes in audit rates without a fine on the behavior of Dutch health care providers, reporting almost no evidence for behavioral responses. Our medically framed experiment allows us to compare two situations: (a) No-Audit and (b) Audit-and-fine, comprising a binding, random audit rule (in 10% of the cases an audit takes place) and a considerable fine if dishonest reporting is detected. The fine implies that the variable payment for the birth weight reporting task is foregone when fraudulent behavior is detected in at least one of the six entries. We thus provide further evidence on the effect of auditing on the behavior of individuals in a health care setting.
Third, we relate to the literature linking individual characteristics and (dishonest) behavior. Evidence on the impact of gender on dishonest behavior is rather mixed. Although Childs (2012) , Gylfason, Arnardottir, and Kristinsson (2013) , and Abeler, Becker, and Falk (2014) report no gender differences in dishonest behavior, there is also considerable experimental evidence that women are more honest than men (e.g., Dreber & Johannesson, 2008; Houser et al., 2012; Muehlheusser, Roider, & Wallmeier, 2015) . We also link subjects' reporting behavior to their major as recent experimental evidence shows that medical students behave more altruistically compared with economics students (Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, & Wiesen, 2016 , 2017 Hennig-Schmidt & Wiesen, 2014) .
Fourth, personality traits oftentimes are measured by the Five-Factor Model, which comprises Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (John, Naumann, & Soto, 2011) . 5 Experimental evidence, however, is mixed as to which specific traits are behaviorally relevant (e.g., Bejarano, Green, & Rassenti, 2016) and whether their impact depends on the experimental context and task. For instance, Conscientiousness has been found to be positively correlated with individuals' performance in an experimental real-effort task, whereas for Neuroticism, there is a negative relationship (Cubel, Nuevo-Chiquero, Sanchez-Pages, & Vidal-Fernandez, 2016) . Similar relationships are observed in health care settings (Callen et al., 2018; Donato et al., 2017) . In dictator games, Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman (2004) find more agreeable female dictators to share more with their recipients, whereas more conscientious and neurotic female dictators shared less. Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, Walkowitz, and Wichardt (2015) report all five personality traits to be significantly related to risk attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2011) , with Extraversion and Openness having a positive and all other traits having a negative impact. Bartling, Fehr, Marechal, and Schunk (2009) find that the more agreeable subjects are less likely to self-select into competitive environments. Most relevant for our setup, evidence on the relationship between dishonest behaviors and personality traits is quite mixed as indicated in Heck et al.'s (2018) meta-study. 6 They only report consistently that subjects' Agreeableness was negatively associated with unethical behavior. The demonstrated inconsistencies in the literature show the need for a deeper understanding of how different individual characteristics affect behavior in different contexts (Borghans et al., 2008) .
To the best of our knowledge, empirical evidence on the relationship between personality traits and dishonest behavior in a medical context is lacking. We employ a 10-item short-version questionnaire of the Big Five Inventory (Gosling et al., 2003; Rammstedt & John, 2007) to elicit personality traits and relate them to dishonesty. Moreover, we analyze how reporting behavior is affected by integrity (Schlenker, 2008) and risk attitudes as measured by Dohmen et al. (2011) . While adding to the literature by exploring the impact of sociodemographics on dishonest behavior, we further explore the link between these individual characteristics and upcoding in a neonatal care setting. We thus complement the empirical literature on DRG upcoding, which, due to aggregate data, is not able to analyze how individual characteristics relate to dishonest behavior.
Fifth, our paper relates to the literature on credence goods. In credence goods markets, goods and services are provided by an expert who has an informational advantage about the quality a consumer needs. The market for health care services is a prime example for a credence goods market (e.g., Bester & Dahm, 2018; Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck, Kerschbamer, & Sutter, 2011; Emons, 1997) . In a health care market with regulated prices, physicians act as experts and insured patients seek medical care. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to defraud patients by pretending to perform inappropriately high levels of medical treatment leading to overcharging patients. Because of moral hazard, this is even exaggerated when patients are fully insured (Balafoutas, Kerschbamer, & Sutter, 2017; Pauly, 1974; Sülzle & Wambach, 2005) . The simple reporting task of birth weights in our experiment framed in neonatal care captures this logic. Defrauding in our experiment means upcoding a newborn child into a better reimbursed DRG. The latter would, however, be justified only if more medical services were to be expected due to an actual lower birth weight. The nonoptimal provision of medical services (overprovision or underprovision) is ruled out in our design as we assume that medical services are rendered optimally according to the actual birth weight; for more details, see Section 4. This assumption is motivated by recent empirical findings that indicate that upcoding in neonatal care does not affect the medical service provision (Jürges & Köberlein, 2015; Reif et al., 2018) . Our analysis is therefore neither confounded by the misalignment of physicians' and patients' interest in medical treatment decisions nor by physicians' considerations for the patients' co-payments. We are thus able to analyze the pure incentive effect of DRG upcoding. Nevertheless, there are examples for overproviding services in health care with misaligned goals of physicians and patients in terms of medical service provision and where defrauding patients is even likely to imply harmful procedures for the patient. A well-documented example is the unnecessary cesarean sections; see, for example, Gruber and Owings (1996) , Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin (1999) , Johnson and Rehavi (2016) , and Currie and MacLeod (2017) .
Finally, our study is related to the growing experimental economics literature analyzing dishonest behavior; see Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond (forthcoming) for a comprehensive review. Dishonest behavior is analyzed, for example, in the "die-in-a-cup" game (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013 ), a coin toss (Abeler et al., 2014) , or a matrix task (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008) . The key difference of our study compared with these earlier studies is the medical frame, in particular the neonatology context, of the experiment. This frame may provide arguments that either justify or discourage dishonest behavior. Such frame-induced motives are absent in neutrally framed experiments. 7 We will further discuss this aspect in Section 6.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: NEONATAL CARE UNITS IN GERMANY
We now present some background on neonatal care units in Germany, and we explain the DRG reimbursement scheme and the embedded incentives for upcoding. Since 2003, reimbursement for neonatal care in German hospitals is based on the following case characteristics: birth weight, surgical (OR-) procedures, long-term artificial respiration, complications, and 5-and 28-day mortality. Birth weight is the most important determinant: DRGs are defined along eight birth weight thresholds: 600, 750, 875, 1,000, 1,250, 1,500, 2,000, and 2,500 g. Reimbursement substantially rises at each threshold; that is, very small differences in birth weight can yield differences in reimbursements by 15,000 Euro (about U.S.$ 17,800) or more. Since reimbursement for each DRG is determined to cover the true average treatment costs in that group, all 7 Note that we are among the first to analyze dishonest behavior by individual decision data using a confidential payment procedure that allows us to observe whether an individual report is truthful or not but does not allow us to link individual decisions to the individual subject. To the best of our knowledge, very few studies use a similar payment procedure as we do (e.g., Abeler et al., forthcoming; Gneezy, Kajackaite, & Sobel, 2018) . In nearly all other previous experimental studies, an individual report cannot be identified as truthful; an exception is, for example, Kocher, Schudy, and Spantig (2018) , who, however, do not use a confidential payment method. The researcher, however, can judge whether the reports are biased towards better paid outcomes by comparing behavioral data with a random distribution. Our paper further contributes to the literature by using an experimental design that-unlike most "die-in-a-cup" game studies-provides constant payoffs for several different weights (rolled numbers in the "die-in-a-cup" design).
newborns with a birth weight just above some threshold value (if reported honestly) will create a financial loss to the hospital, whereas all newborns with a true birth weight just below some threshold will create financial gain.
As documented in Jürges and Köberlein (2015) and Reif et al. (2018) , hospitals appear to react by manipulating the recorded birth weight and by reclassifying newborns to better paying DRGs. Although the true treatment costs of each newborn remain the same, reimbursement will jump from lower-than-expected treatment costs to higher-than-expected treatment costs. The current setting embeds a strong incentive for dishonest reporting. This incentive is reinforced by the fact that individual cases of birth weight manipulation (within reasonable limits) can hardly be detected ex post. Newborn infants lose around 4% to 7% of their weight within the first 24 hours due to initial postnatal weight loss (e.g., Flaherman et al., 2015) , which makes detection even more difficult. Since DRGs in neonatology are partly determined by the reported birth weight entered in the birth report, obstetrics on the ward are actually responsible for the "coding" and not, as one might assume, a coder in the hospital's administration.
DRG upcoding in neonatology leads to substantial financial losses for health insurers. In the first eight years after the introduction of DRGs, hospitals have gained additional reimbursement in excess of 100 million Euro (Jürges & Köberlein, 2015) . Thus, research needs to focus on the determinants of DRG upcoding in neonatology to understand better the decision makers' underlying motivations. This would enable policy-makers to design reimbursement systems, but also institutions that reduce the incentives for fraudulent behavior like, for instance, (tighter) audits and fines often debated among health care policy-makers.
THE EXPERIMENT

Design
In our medically framed experiment, subjects take the roles of obstetrics staff members. Each subject i is entrusted with recording the birth weight (w j ) of six preterm infants j into their neonatal birth reports. Reported birth weights can take nine different values in grams w j ∈ [1,150, … , 1,550] in intervals of 50 g. Subject i decides which birth weight (ŵ i ) to enter into the birth record after having seen the true weight w j on the computer screen. Six true birth weights are randomly drawn and shown in random order on the subjects' screens: These are 1,200, 1,250, 1,300, 1,350, 1,400, and 1,500 g. These birth weights are the same for all subjects, and each birth weight occurs only once.
Subjects receive a fixed lump-sum payment F and a variable payment depending on the reported birth weights. The individually reported birth weightsŵ i determine subject i's payment (DRG reimbursement rates) per case p(ŵ i ). 8 The medical treatment of the preterm infants incurs costs c, which are, on average, almost compensated by the lump-sum reimbursement. The costs c(w j ) depend on the true birth weight, w j , displayed on the scale. All six decisions are payoff relevant. Subject i's overall profit is therefore
Further, we assume that each early-born infant receives optimal medical care according to its true birth weight w j -irrespective of the reported birth weightŵ i . 9 Figure 1 illustrates the DRG reimbursement rates and costs in our experiment. We choose birth weights to be in the middle range of real-world figures for preterm infants, which allow us to consider two thresholds (one at 1,250 g and another at 1,500 g). The parameter values for the DRG reimbursement rates in our experiment are adapted to the German DRG system. They are set such that the average costs for the medical treatment of an early-born infant are almost covered within the DRGs. Table 1 shows the profit levels for each combination of reported and true birth weights.
Reporting lower than true birth weights within a DRG has no consequences for the subjects' profits, as the reimbursement is fixed within the same DRG and the cost to be deducted is based on the true birth weight. It is only by upcoding that subjects gain additional profit-in particular, when subjects report a birth weight lower than the next or next but one lower threshold.
At the true birth weight of 1,500 g, we can distinguish between full and partial dishonesty. Subjects can upcode either by one or by two DRG thresholds. We thus are able to analyze whether subjects-in order to receive the maximum 8 We are aware that the payment assumption somewhat abstracts from the real world. Obstetrics staff members and physicians might not directly benefit from DRG payments depending on their reported birth weight. However, it seems reasonable to assume that they at least indirectly benefit from upcoding. This is, for example, the case if the additional resources resulting from the upcoding decision that are not needed for the treatment of the newborns are spent on better medical equipment or additional personnel. Moreover, there is evidence that physicians do receive high-powered incentives to upcode in the form of equity ownership and lavish vacations for themselves and their families (e.g., Silverman & Skinner, 2004) . Physicians have also been reported to be individually rewarded by health insurers if they "optimize" coding practices by upcoding (Scherff, 2016) . 9 This assumption seems reasonable, in light of recent empirical evidence by, for example, Reif et al. (2018) , which indicates that financial incentives related to the birth weight thresholds do not directly impact the medical care that newborns receive.
FIGURE 1 Diagnosis-related group (DRG) reimbursement rates and medical treatment cost. This figure shows the DRG reimbursement rates and the average medical treatment costs associated with the reported and the true birth weights, respectively. The birth weight thresholds are adopted from the German DRG system, and the values for reimbursement and cost are indicated in Taler, our experimental currency. These values are calibrated using actual DRG reimbursement rates as reference values Note. This table shows profits for the weights in the subjects' choice range (first column) and the birth weights that can be entered in the birth report (second row). Note that reimbursements depend on the reported birth weights. Diagnosis-related group thresholds are at 1,250 and 1,500. Costs depend on the true birth weight and increase with decreasing birth weights. All monetary amounts are given in Taler, our experimental currency, the exchange rate being 1 Taler = 0.01 EUR.
profit-upcode to the full extent (i.e., reportingŵ = 1,200 or below). We define this reporting behavior as fully dishonest. When upcoding by one DRG threshold (i.e., reporting 1,250 ≤ŵ < 1,450), subjects receive a payment higher than by reporting honestly, but lower than the maximum profit. We define this behavior as partially dishonest. For all birth weights, we call reporting behavior honest when subjects enter the true birth weight shown on their computer screen. Recall that partial and full dishonesty have been indicated in the experimental literature as full and partial lying, respectively (e.g., Abeler et al., 2014, forthcoming; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013 ). 10
Treatments
At a between-subject level, we vary the detection probability of fraudulently reported birth weights. In the baseline treatment No-Audit, the detection probability is zero, and the subjects' upcoding has no financial or other consequences. In treatment Audit-and-fine, the subjects' reported birth weights are audited with a probability of 10%. In case a subject is audited and at least one misreported birth weight is detected, all earnings based on the DRG reimbursement rates are discarded. Subjects then are paid out the fixed amount F only. Our audit mechanism makes use of the fact that a newborn baby loses a certain percentage of its birth weight in the first 24 hours. Following Flaherman et al. (2015) , we use 5% in our experiment (see Section S1). If the weight measured on the day after birth is higher than the recorded birth weight, the latter is too low, which constitutes attempted fraud.
TABLE 2 Experimental treatments
Detection
Number of subjects Treatment probability (%) Payment (medical students)
44 (27) (no audit and no fine)
•F, if cheating is detected Audit-and-fine 10%
Note. This table shows treatments, the parameters for detection probabilities, the payment formula, and the number of participants (medical students). The fixed payment F amounts to 400 Taler = 4 EUR. Variable payments depend on subjects' decisions; see Table 1 .
After all decisions have been taken, the subjects are informed whether the birth weights that subjects had entered were audited and whether a false entry was discovered. Table 2 provides an overview on our experimental treatments. One distinct feature of our experiment is that, even in the Audit-and-fine treatment, participants can behave dishonestly without fear of being detected at some of the birth weights. Due to our parameter specification, underreporting of birth weights up to 50 g cannot be detected, whereas larger manipulations within and between DRGs can. This feature allows a comparison of upcoding with and without detection probability in the same treatment. Specifically, upcoding is attractive at true birth weights just above remuneration thresholds, as a comparatively small manipulation by 50 g will increase profits at no detection risk. For true birth weights just above the DRG thresholds (1,250 and 1,500 g), subjects can upcode without the threat of being detected. 11 Recall the rather serious fine of discarding all profits from entering the six birth weights for a participating subject if one of his or her reports is found to understate the birth weight by more than 50 g. Nevertheless, an expected value maximizing individual would still be expected to make five fully dishonest decisions in the Audit-and-fine treatment; that is, report 1,150 or 1,200 g for the true birth weights 1,250, 1,300, 1,350, 1,400, and 1,500 g.
Protocol
The computerized experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at BonnEconLab, the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the University of Bonn, in May and December 2014 and in December 2015. Overall, 98 students participated in our experimental sessions. Among those were 51 medical students, of whom 27 (24) participated in the No-Audit (Audit-and-fine) treatment. Of the 47 economics students, 17 took part in the No-Audit and 30 in the Audit-and-fine condition. The average age was 23 years.
Subjects were recruited via the online recruiting systems ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and hroot (Bock, Baetge, & Nicklisch, 2014) . The recruiting process of subjects was the following: Students who registered in ORSEE for laboratory experiments at BonnEconLab were invited via automatically generated e-mails to participate in the experimental conditions of our experiment. When signing up, subjects did not know about the decision task, the composition of subjects, or about our research objective. This procedure guaranteed the random allocation of students to experimental treatments and excluded self-selection into audit conditions. The procedure in both treatments was as follows: Upon arrival, subjects were randomly allocated to cubicles. They were then given ample time to read the instructions and ask clarifying questions, which were answered in private. To verify that the subjects had understood the decision task, they had to answer a set of control questions. The experiment did not start unless all subjects had answered all control questions correctly. 12 Then, subjects anonymously decided for six early-born infants which birth weight to enter into each early born's medical record after having seen the true birth weight on the computer screen. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the screens in both treatments. The birth weights subjects faced were given in individualized predetermined random order. The introduction stressed that the subjects' decisions were confidential and anonymous and that the experimenter could not identify who had entered which birth weight.
FIGURE 2
Screenshots for treatments "No-Audit" and "Audit-and-fine." The left panel shows a sample decision screen in the baseline treatment, and the right panel shows a screen from the Audit-and-fine treatment. In both screens, subjects are asked to enter the birth weight, which is displayed on top of the screen (here: 1,500 g). Subjects can receive additional information when clicking on the button labeled "Information." They are informed on the reimbursement based on their entry, the costs based on the true birth weight, and the resulting profit. In the Audit-and-fine condition, subjects are provided with additional information on the lower bound of the newborn's weight at the second weighing (here: 1,425 g) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Before entering the birth weight of a specific baby, subjects could learn about the respective lump-sum remuneration, the treatment cost for each birth weight, and the resulting profit by clicking an information button on their computer screen. In the Audit-and-fine treatment, subjects could also learn about the lower bound of the preterm infant's weight on the day after birth. All monetary amounts were given in Taler, our experimental currency, the exchange rate being 1 Taler = 0.01 Euro. 13 Subjects were also informed about the fixed payment F amounting to 400 Taler.
After having made all six decisions, subjects were asked to answer a questionnaire on gender, age, attitudes, and personality. Subjects received an additional 4 Euro for answering the questionnaire. Finally, they were paid by a confidential payment procedure that did not allow us to trace any individual subjects' decisions, and they subsequently left the laboratory. Sessions lasted about 45 min, including filling in the postexperimental questionnaire. Subjects earned 10.30 euro on average, including the payment of 4 euro for answering the questionnaires (Audit: 11.86 euro, Audit-and-fine: 9.02 euro).
RESULTS
Reporting behavior in treatment "No-Audit"
We first address Research question 1 that is concerned with the degree of the subjects' dishonesty in the baseline "No-Audit" treatment. We further investigate whether subjects upcode to the full extent or only partially; that is, we analyze whether for the true birth weight of 1,500 g subjects upcode by two thresholds (by reporting birth weights even below 1,250 g) or whether they upcode to the next DRG threshold only and forgo the maximum profit (partial dishonesty).
We start with a descriptive analysis of the full data set of 264 entries by showing the distribution of true and reported birth weights under the baseline No-Audit treatment. Table 3 provides an overview on the subjects' reported birth weights for all true birth weights. Light gray cells indicate underreported birth weights. Darker cells show correctly reported weights, whereas white cells denote overstated birth weights. Table 3 indicates that a substantial share of reported birth weights is below the true weight (light gray shaded area) and a strong cumulation below the 1,250 g threshold.
In Table 4 , we further categorize the subjects' reporting behavior. Only 22% of all birth weight entries under No-Audit are honest (57 of the 264 decisions). The majority of reported birth weights imply upcoding, namely, 73% (192 decisions). That means that nearly three quarters of all decisions in the No-Audit condition increase the subjects' payoffs by fraudulent upcoding. Sixty-one percent of these (162 decisions) comprise upcoding by one and 11% (30 decisions) by two DRGs. The remaining 6% of decisions imply reporting birth weights that are not payoff increasing-either within a DRG or above a DRG threshold (which implies higher cost and therefore lower payoffs compared with honest reporting; recall Table 1) . 150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 1,450 1,500 1 Note. This table provides an overview of the subjects' reporting behavior. In category "Other misreporting," we consider reported birth weights that imply no financial gain and comprise underreported true birth weights within the same diagnosis-related group (DRG), as well as overreported birth weights. Numbers in parentheses refer to entries in No-Audit at those weights where upcoding is (non)detectable in Audit-and-fine.
When looking only at the 220 decisions where upcoding is possible (excluding the true weight of 1,200 g) and where payoffs can actively be increased by fraudulent reporting, we find 87% dishonest answers. At the true birth weight of 1,500 g, only one person (2%) decides honestly; 27% (12 out of 44 subjects) upcode by one threshold and behave partially dishonestly, which means they make less than the maximum profit; 68% (30 of the 44 participants) make the maximum profit by upcoding across two thresholds, thus behaving fully dishonestly; see Table 3 . In sum, we state the following:
Result 1. In the No-Audit treatment, nearly three quarters of all decisions imply upcoding (dishonest report of birth weight, which increases an individual's payoff). For the true birth weight of 1,500 g (at which different levels of dishonest behavior are distinguishable)
, about 70% of all decisions are fully dishonest, about 25% are partially dishonest, and 5% behave honestly.
Reporting behavior in treatment "Audit-and-fine"
We now investigate whether the introduction of a random audit (10% detection probability) coupled with a substantial fine reduces upcoding (Research question 2). Table 5 shows the frequency of reported weights for the true birth weights in the Audit-and-fine treatment. We find that introducing random audit and a fine substantially affects the subjects' reporting behavior. The percentage of all honest birth weight reports almost doubles to 43% (140 of the 324 decisions); see Table 4 . This is a highly significant increase by 22 percentage points compared with the baseline treatment (p ≤ 0.001, Fisher exact test, two-tailed). Upcoding is reduced to 50%, whereas other misreporting comprises 7% of all choices. When analyzing decisions only where upcoding is possible (excluding entries for w j = 1,200 g), 60% of birth weights are reported dishonestly, a reduction by around 27 percentage points.
Estimation results from logit models confirm the nonparametric analyses. Introducing audits and fines significantly reduces the likelihood of upcoding; see Model 1 in Table 6 . This finding is robust when controlling for individuals' gender, major, and other individuals' characteristics; see Model 2 in Table 6 . In sum, we state the following result:
Result 2. On aggregate, introducing a random audit (10% detection probability) coupled with a fine significantly reduces dishonest behavior. Honest reports increase, whereas upcoding is significantly reduced.
Next, we analyze whether introducing audits and fines leads to more honest reporting in general or whether we observe less upcoding only at birth weights where dishonesty is detectable (Research question 3) . Estimation results show that upcoding is only reduced significantly at birth weights where upcoding can be detected; see Model 3 in Table 6 . The coefficient of the interaction term of "Audit-and-fine × Detection" indicates a decrease of about 38 percentage points. The main effect is robust when including individual controls; see Model 4 in Table 6 . At birth weights where detection is not possible (1,250 g ), the effect of audit is small and statistically insignificant. Upcoding does significantly differ between birth weights where detection is possible and where it is not; see 2 values for Models 3 and 4 in Table 6 . In sum, our treatment variation makes an important point concerning audits and fines. They appear not to cause more honest behavior in general but reduce the willingness to engage in upcoding only where it is detectable.
Finally, we analyze behavior at the true birth weight of 1,500 g. Table 5 shows that honest behavior rises to 17% (nine of 54 decisions)-compared with 2% under No-Audit. Upcoding that cannot be detected by an audit (reporting 1,450 g instead of 1,500 g) rises to 50%. This is a significant increase of 22 percentage points compared with the baseline treatment (p = 0.013, Fisher exact test, two-tailed). Estimation results from a multinomial logit model on the probability of being honest, partially dishonest, and fully dishonest confirm and extend the nonparametric analysis; see Table 7 . Model 1 shows that introducing Audit-and-fine reduces the probability of being fully dishonest significantly by 40 percentage points. This reduction is accompanied by a strong shift from fully dishonest to partially dishonest behavior and by a smaller percentage point increase of honest entries. Many participants thus chose the safe, but lower profit of 60 Taler, rather than the risky but higher return of 240 Taler (recall Table 1 ). This finding is robust when including covariates; see Model 2 in Table 7 . In sum, we state the following result: 
Students' major and gender
We now analyze how individuals' major and gender relate to dishonest behavior and to behavioral responses when audits and fines are introduced (Research question 4). Table 8 shows that, in the absence of Audit-and-fine, medical students are on average more likely to upcode compared with economists (by 10 percentage points). Introducing audits has a significant effect only on medical students' upcoding, reducing upcoding by 43 percentage points. Economics students, 
Note. This table shows average marginal effects based on logit models. Standard errors are clustered at the individual subject level shown in parentheses. We consider decisions only where upcoding is possible, which means that we exclude entries for w j = 1,200 g. The dependent variable "Upcoding" = 1 if individuals misreport birth weights such that their payoff increases, and 0 otherwise. Individual control variables: four age categories (18-20, 21-25, 25-29, 30+) , gender (in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6), field of study (columns 3, 4, 7, and 8), Big Five Inventory, and integrity. In Models 5 to 8, the data for 1,500 g are excluded due to the detection possibility being endogenous. a z-values for difference of estimated parameters across equations were obtained as z-values of interaction effects in fully interacted models. FE, fixed effects.
on the other hand, show an insignificant response to the introduction of Audit-and-fine; see Models 1 and 2 in Table 8 . The difference between medical and economics students in responding to Audit-and-fine is significant at the 5% level; see z-value difference for estimates of Models 1 and 2. When separating between birth weights where detection is possible and where detection is not possible, we find further differences between medical and economics students. The likelihood of upcoding is reduced by nearly 60 percentage points for medical students, but only by 10 percentage points for economists. At birth weights where detection is not possible, however, the likelihood of upcoding increases significantly for economists by about 30 percentage points compared with No-Audit; see Models 5 and 6 in Table 8 . Medical students, in contrast, reduce upcoding, albeit not significantly. Again, we find a significant difference between medical and economics students; see the z-value difference for estimates of Models 5 and 6.
As to gender, in treatment "No-Audit," upcoding does not differ between females and males. Introducing Audit-and-fine significantly reduces the likelihood for upcoding for both genders. The magnitude of the response is higher for women (36 percentage points) than for men (16 percentage points). This difference is weakly significant; see Models 3 and 4 in Table 8 ; see also Models 2 and 4 in Table 6 . According to Models 7 and 8, we observe a similar difference between female and male subjects when detection is possible. When upcoding cannot be detected, we find no significant response compared with the No-Audit treatment. The differences between weights where detection is possible and where it is not are always significant at the 5% level, for major as well as for gender, see Models 5 to 8. In sum, we state the following: 
Personality traits, integrity, and risk aversion
In this section, we address Research question 5 on how the individuals' personality traits, integrity, and risk aversion relate to upcoding and responses to audits and fines. To this end, we use the short 10-item Big Five Inventory, a questionnaire Note. This table shows average marginal effects based on logit models. Standard errors clustered on subject level in parentheses. We consider decisions only where upcoding is possible, which means that we exclude entries for w j = 1,200 g. In the regressions, we control for gender, medical major, four age categories (18-20, 21-25, 25-29, 30+) , and the true birth weights shown. In Model 4, we also control for social trust. All personality characteristics are measured on a scale from −1 to +1. The coefficients thus reflect the effect of a one-unit change; for example, a change from the theoretical minimum to the (neutral) midpoint or from the midpoint to the theoretical maximum.
on integrity as well as a questionnaire item measuring risk attitudes. For descriptive statistics on the personality measures separated by experimental treatment, gender, and students' major, see Table S1 and Figure S1 . Table 9 shows marginal effects of personality traits measures and integrity for the treatments "No-Audit" and "Audit-and-fine" separately and for both combined. All covariates in this table are scaled from −1 to +1. The coefficients thus reflect the effect of a change from the theoretical minimum to the (neutral) midpoint or from the midpoint to the theoretical maximum. Effects of risk aversion are analyzed for the Audit-and-fine treatment only, as risk attitudes have only been elicited in this treatment.
For personality traits, we do not find systematic effects across treatments. 14 For example, in No-Audit, more conscientious individuals are 48 percentage points more likely to upcode birth weights. We, however, observe no significant effect under Audit-and-fine; see Models 1 and 2 of Table 9 . We further investigate the effect of audits on upcoding by differentiating between individuals with different levels of Conscientiousness. Table S2 shows estimation results for individuals split at the median level of Conscientiousness. We find that low conscientious subjects are somewhat less likely to upcode in the No-Audit treatment (84% versus 97%). Under Audit-and fine, however, we see a noteworthy effect. Participants high in Conscientiousness show a significant reaction to Audit-and fine although this is not the case for low conscientious subjects. The former reduce upcoding by 35 percentage points on average and by 52 percentage points when upcoding is detectable. When upcoding cannot be detected, participants low in Conscientiousness are significantly more dishonest whereas highly conscientious subjects show no measurable reaction. Figure S1 provides further evidence for these results. Yet, only when controlling for the other Big Five items, these effects become obvious.
We also find that more neurotic individuals are significantly less likely to upcode under No-Audit, although we observe no such effect under Audit-and-fine; see Models 1 and 2 of Table 9 . When investigating the effect of audits on upcoding by splitting at the median level of Neuroticism, we observe that in contrast to our findings on Conscientiousness, subjects low and high in Neuroticism reduce upcoding significantly under Audit-and fine, also when detection is possible (see Table  S3 ). When it is not, participants low in Neuroticism only weakly significantly reduce upcoding whereas highly neurotic subjects show no measurable reaction. Finally, more open individuals are also less likely to upcode, with a significant coefficient only for the combined data set; see Model 3 of Table 9 .
As to integrity, we find that individuals with higher integrity are less likely to misreport birth weights. The estimates are negative and of similar orders of magnitude for all model specifications in Table 9 and significant at a 5% level for the combined data set. In particular, individuals with higher integrity are 31 percentage points less likely to upcode; see Model 3 of Table 9 . Further, when splitting the sample at the median level of integrity, we observe that individuals with low integrity tend to upcode more in the No-Audit treatment (92% versus 82%); see Table S4 . Audit-and-fine significantly reduces the likelihood of upcoding for individuals with low and high integrity in a very similar magnitude (about 21 percentage points). The same holds true when detection of misreporting is possible under audit (about 30 percentage points).
For risk aversion, coefficients indicate that when individuals are more risk averse, they are slightly less likely (6 percentage points) to misreport birth weights. Although intuitively meaningful, this finding is not significant, however; see Model 4 of 
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss our findings in light of the related literature. First, we address the effect of introducing audits and fines simultaneously. Recall that the vast majority of the subjects' decisions in our baseline treatment reflects dishonesty (Result 1). Introducing a random audit (10% detection probability) coupled with a fine significantly reduces the likelihood of upcoding (Result 2). One might argue that audits as such without fining will be sufficient to enhance honest behavior. Theoretical argumentation and empirical evidence suggest that this seems not to be the case. From a (classical) theoretical perspective, a fine is necessary to induce compliance (e.g., Becker, 1968; Kuhn & Siciliani, 2013; Mookherjee & Png, 1989) . From an empirical point of view, audits alone (without a fine) do not seem to significantly affect health care providers' behavior (Lindeboom et al., 2016) . Moreover, reports from the German Statutory Health Insurance Funds (SHI) indicate inferior effectiveness of audits alone. Until 2013, German hospitals did not bear the risk of any fines if they were caught making incorrect claims-if detected, hospitals only had to return the amount that was incorrectly claimed. In the absence of fines, the incorrect claims even rose from 35% in 2006 to more than 50% in 2011 (GKV-Spitzenverband, 2013, p. 15 ; see also Bundesrechnungshof, 2011b, p. 7) . 15 Second, a concern might relate to using a sample of students in our experiment, as their behavior might differ from physicians. There are, however, meaningful arguments and evidence that student participants provide valid information as well. For one thing, medical students are future physicians and economics students are future managers. Moreover, experimental evidence indicates that the behavior of students and physicians does not differ qualitatively (Brosig-Koch et al., 2016; Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, Kokot, & Wiesen, 2018; Wang, Iversen, Hennig-Schmidt, & Godager, 2017) . Further, it has been shown that dishonest student behavior is a predictor for behavior in prospective work environments. For instance, Sims (1993) reports that individuals who admitted to having engaged in academic misconduct also admitted to a wide range of unethical business practices. In addition, those subjects who engaged in behavior considered severely dishonest in college also engaged in behavior considered severely dishonest at work. Several recent studies showing that behavior in lying experiments significantly correlates with cheating behavior outside the lab (Cohn & Marechal, 2018; Dai, Galeotti, & Villeval, 2017; Hanna & Wang, 2017; Potters & Stoop, 2016) ; see Abeler et al. (forthcoming) for a comprehensive overview. 15 In Germany, hospitals are audited by the MDK of the SHI. The MDK sends teams to randomly selected hospitals to evaluate the coding of patient treatment by auditing patients' medical records. Moreover, if the audit did not result in any reduction of the reimbursement claim, the SHI even had to pay an expense allowance to the hospital for preparing the "unsuccessful" auditing. As incorrect claims rose, the regulations in Germany did not seem to provide appropriate incentives for hospitals to change their practices. In contrast, as the SHI report points out, they protected those hospitals that submitted incorrect claims. SHI heavily complained and insisted that effective sanctions had to be established by law to reduce the number of incorrect billings and thus the loss to the insurers and the insured. Since then, law regulations did change (GKV-Spitzenverband, 2017) , even though they are not as far reaching as, for instance, in the United States.
Third, our finding that medical students are rather dishonest under No-Audit might be surprising at first sight. It is, however, in line with self-report studies showing rather high percentages of cheating behavior admitted by medical students (e.g., Kukolja Taradi, Taradi, Knežević, & Dogaš, 2010; Rennie & Crosby, 2001; Sierles, Hendrickx, & Circle, 1980) or by nursing students (e.g., Krueger, 2014) . As to the missing impact of gender on dishonest behavior under No-Audit, our results correspond to those of self-report studies; see, for example, Rennie and Rudland (2003) .
Fourth, we find that personality traits are not systematically related to dishonest behavior across treatments. The reason might be that our personality measures are noisy and the sample is small. We think it is worth noting, however, that Conscientiousness is significant for increasing and Neuroticism for reducing upcoding under No-Audit. This is in line with behavioral experiments showing that Conscientiousness is positively and Neuroticism is negatively correlated with performance (Callen et al., 2018; Cubel et al., 2016; Donato et al., 2017) . Conscientious people are characterized as being industrious, systematic, dutiful, high on achievement striving, and hardworking (Trautwein, Luedtke, Roberts, Schnyder, & Niggli, 2009 ). In our experiment, participants with these traits can be thought of as those people who strive for high payoffs by upcoding and take into account that their dishonest behavior cannot be detected. 16 Even though our results have to be taken with some caveat, our study contributes to the discussion that the role of context, including incentives and observational frames, on the measurement of personality traits is not well understood. To this end, Borghans et al. (2008) stress that a broader array of different scenarios needs to be studied in order to standardize for incentives, market forces, personality, cognitive traits, and context/framing.
Finally, we find that the mere extent of (full and partial) dishonesty in our experiment exceeds reported dishonest behavior in the experimental literature (Abeler et al., 2014; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Mazar et al., 2008) . Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) find that 39% of subjects are honest and about 20% lie to the fullest extent. In a survey of 72 experimental studies from 43 countries, Abeler et al. (forthcoming) report that subjects forgo on average about three quarters of the potential gains from lying. These experiments do not employ audits and, therefore, are comparable with our No-Audit treatment.
In contrast to our study in nearly all lying experiments, the researcher does not know whether an individual is lying, and only a few studies use a design similar to ours in which the researcher can observe whether individuals are dishonest. When using a double-blind payment procedure as we do, Abeler et al. (forthcoming) find reported numbers to be considerably lower, with only 17% participants lying. In a nondouble-blind procedure, the authors state the share of subjects misreporting their draw to be lower, but not significantly. Gneezy et al. (2018) find that in the observed treatment, the reported numbers are significantly higher than the actual outcomes, with 26% of participants lying. 17 Notably, the share of dishonest behavior in our experiment is even more pronounced when contrasted with studies using a more germane payment procedure.
The high share of dishonest behavior in our experiment was a somewhat unexpected result. We, therefore, can only conjecture about its potential causes and provide some plausible explanations.
Confidential payment procedure. We used a confidential payment procedure that allows us to observe whether an individual report is truthful or not but does not allow us to link individual decisions to the individual subject. We employed this method to make sure that subjects are not influenced in their (dis)honest behavior by concerns that their decisions are observed and traced back. We also stressed the confidentiality of the payment procedure in Section S1 (p. 5). This may have drawn increased attention of the subjects to the fact that upcoding cannot be detected and may have increased dishonesty. Payoffs. Typically, lying experiments are piggybacked to other unrelated experiments. That means subjects earn additional money by taking part in the unrelated experiments, whereas in our experiment, the reporting task is the only source of payoff (besides a payment for completing the post-experimental questionnaire). Loss aversion. Our experiment is designed according to the German DRG reimbursement scheme for neonatal care. The DRG rates are set such that average costs are covered. Therefore, gains and losses (depending on the true birth weight) are involved when reporting honestly. Losses do not occur in the above-mentioned literature on lying: When reporting truly, subjects may gain or leave the experiment with neither gaining nor losing. Even though in our experiment losses and gains are nearly balanced, avoiding a loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) for any entry may have induced subjects to behave rather dishonestly. In a similar vein, aversion against losses at some birth weights may also explain part of the high inclination to upcode in neonatology under the German DRG reimbursement system. Medical framing. Our study uses a neonatology frame that might have served as a justification for dishonest behavior. In an open question, about 20% of the subjects in the No-Audit treatment stated as motives for their decisions that they did not see any problems in upcoding because the early-born baby receives optimal medical care, irrespectively of the DRG payment participants receive. About 10% of the participants in the same treatment used arguments regarding the hospital-for example, upcoding would be justified because financial burdens of the hospital are reduced, and it thus allows the hiring of additional personnel or the buying of equipment, which in turn benefits the patient in the end. Such motives are absent in the studies on dishonesty mentioned above. For a more detailed analysis of social justification and ethical behavior, see, for example, Klein, Thielmann, Hilbig, and Zettler, (2017) . Several of our above arguments relate prominently to our experimental design and might therefore overestimate upcoding behavior compared with real settings. Yet the surveys quoted in Sections 1 and 2 highlight the huge losses health insurers incur by upcoding practices. Our main research question is whether and how DRG upcoding is affected by audits coupled with fines. In that respect, we believe our study provides evidence for a reduction in dishonest behavior that may mirror qualitative tendencies to be expected in the field.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The evidence of the existence of dishonesty in health care provided by our experimental methodology and the factors that may motivate such behavior are important. The nonverifiability of birth weight manipulation in actual neonatal care settings calls for a research method that allows us to study the behavior, characteristics, and underlying motivations of decision makers directly and at the individual level. Currently, false reporting of birth weights can only be revealed indirectly by analyzing aggregate data. Our finding that audit coupled with a fine leads to more honest behavior, and to reduced upcoding when detectable, but that it causes increased dishonesty when detection is not possible highlights two issues. First, audits and fines are important instruments to cope with upcoding. Second, the nondetectability of upcoding birth weights in neonatology inherent in the present reporting system calls for basic changes in the method of recording the birth weight and/or in the overall DRG reimbursement system in Germany 18 to make the system fraud proof.
Our experiment could be seen as a "wind tunnel," testbed, or proof-of-principle approach showing that the phenomena observed in the field can be replicated in a behavioral experiment. We are aware that our experiment simplifies conditions found in the field and that upcoding might be a matter of complex institutions and incentives in practice. For example, in hospitals, no direct one-to-one relationship might exist between how a doctor codes an individual patient and what pay that doctor receives. In addition, the "culture" in a hospital might promote or even encourage upcoding among the members of the organization. A task for future research is to adapt the experimental design to actual hospital structures as well as to construct and test institutions and incentives that promote honest and ethical behavior.
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